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INTRODUCTION

Shortly before the March 1982 Public Utilities Symposium, a
paper prepared by Bruce M. Louiselle and Jean M. Heilman, entitled The Case for the Use of an Appropriate Capital Structure zn Utzh
Ratemaking: The General Rule Versus Amhnesoa was circulated to
participants of the Symposium. In reality, the Louiselle-Heilman
paper does not state the case for the use of an "appropriate" capital structure. It presents, rather, an argument that a capital structure hypothetically related to the capital circumstances of other
companies in the industry, and not a capital structure based on the
company's own financial circumstances, is the "appropriate" capital structure that should be used in ratemaking proceedings. The
Louiselle-Heilman paper argues that a hypothetical structure may

be as safe, and yet more economical, than the utility's actual capital structure, and should be used without regard to whether the
company's actual capital is found to be unreasonable or imprudent.2 The Louiselle-Heilman paper also suggests (what it calls
"the General Rule Versus Minnesota") that the approach adopted
on capital structure matters by the Minnesota Supreme Court and
the Minnesota Public Utility Commission is out of step with the
approach utilized in other jurisdictions. 3 As discussed below, both
of these claims are of dubious validity.
1. Louiselle & Heilman, The Casefor the Use of an Appropriate CapitalStructure in Utility
Ratemaking.: The General Rule Versus Minnesota, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 423 (1982).
2. Id. at 434-36.
3. Id. at 427-28.
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DISCUSSION

Our initial paper for the Public Utilities Symposium reviewed
the major Minnesota commission decisions on capital structure
matters over the last decade in an attempt to discern the commission's approach. 4 Simply stated, the rule that has evolved in Minnesota is that the utility's capital structure, based upon its actual
circumstances, should be used by the commission in a rate case
unless it is found that such capital structure is imprudent and unreasonable. 5 This rule is based on the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State ,6 in which the
court stated the tenet that guides the commission in capital structure determinations:
We have difficulty accepting the concept that in a rate case of
this kind the state may collaterally attack the judgment of the
company in maintaining its embedded debt at a low figure.
We agree with the position of the Company that this is a discretionary matter of management which, in the light of soaring
interest rates, seems to vindicate the company's decision to keep
its debt obligations to a minimum. 7
The rule is inferred from Minnesota Statutes, sections 216B.23
and 237.075(5). These statutes specifically provide that when the
commission determines that rates charged by a utility, or the regulations, measurements, practices, acts or services of a utility, are
unjust or unreasonable, the commission then shall determine the
rates, regulations, measurements, practices, acts or services to be
charged or applied.
At one point, Louiselle and Heilman accept the basic sense of
the capital structure rule applied in Minnesota:
This is not to say that actual capital structure cannot produce
reasonable results; it can. If a can be shown, however, that the actual
4. Brehl & Gallagher, Review of Mtnnesota Pubh Utility Commission Deciruons Regardng
Capital Structure Matters, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 379 (1982).
5. North Cent. Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-101/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977), at 15-16; Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G-011/GR-80-850 (Minn.
P.U.C. Nov. 25, 1981), at 13-14. In North Cent. Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR81-780 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 30, 1982), the commission held that it would not depart from
the actual capital structure of Donovan Companies, unconsolidated, when it was not
shown to be unreasonable or imprudent. In Peoples Natural Gas Co., Docket No. G011/GR-82-65 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 28, 1983), the commission found different circumstances than those present in the preceding Peoples rate case. The commission applied a
hypothetical capital structure because it appeared that the capital structure of the multifaceted parent, InterNorth, was not representative of a gas distribution company.
6. 299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974).
7. Id. at 14-15, 216 N.W.2d at 850.
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capitalstructure (or the one proposed by the company) is imprudent and unreasonable, the commission must reject it and must
base the fair overall rate of8 return on a reasonable, albeit hypothetical, capital structure.
Louiselle and Heilman, however, then depart from this concession
and espouse the view that a hypothetical capital structure, not
based on the actual capital structure, should be imposed without
the necessity of establishing the actual capital structure is unreasonable and imprudent.
Although not always articulating the rule exactly as in Minnesota, the bulk of the jurisdictions that have considered the matter
take essentially the same approach that has been adopted in Minnesota. In most cases, the actual capital structure is departed from
only after there has been a determination that the actual capital
structure is unreasonable and imprudent in some significant respect. 9 These cases recognize, as the Louiselle-Heilman paper ad8. Louiselle & Heilman, supra note 1, at 426 (emphasis added).
9. For example, in Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Washington Util. & Trans.
Comm'n, 98 P.U.R.3d 16 (King County Super. Ct. 1972), the court stated:
Bearing in mind the respective functions of the commission and management
and affirming the proposition that management has the right to determine what
the debt equity should be but that it may not always make the ratepayer foot the
bill resulting from its choice, it would appear to this Court that the proper rule
of law to be set forth in guiding the commission be that the commission may
disregard the existing capital structure of a regulated company when it finds
from the evidence that the existing capital structure is unreasonable so as to
impose an unfair burden on the consumer.
Id. at 26.
In New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 275
N.E.2d 493 (1971), the court stated:
It would be unreasonable and an undue interference with reasonable Company
judgment, for the. . .[Department] to insist that Company's rate of return conform with precision to what the . . .[Department] regards as an optimum 60%
debt ratio. Within a substantial range this is a matter for Company's determination . . . . There is no evidence that . . . Company has adopted an unreason-

able low debt ratio which may be regarded as a 'company luxury' imposing an
undue burden on consumers.
Id. at 466-67, 275 N.E.2d at 508, quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 359
Mass. 292, 269 N.E.2d 28 (1970).
Similarly, in Boston Edison Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 417 (Mass. D.P.U. 1973), the commission stated, "Unless the company's actual capital structure is demonstrably unreasonable,
determinations of a fair rate of return must be based on the applicable, as opposed to a
hypothetical, capital structure." Id. at 419.
In Peoples Natural Gas Div. of Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
193 Colo. 421, 576 P.2d 377 (1977), the court stated, "Unless it has been demonstrated by
a substantial showing that ratepayers are materially prejudiced by the actual capital
structure which finances utility operations, the PUC should use the actual capital structure in calculating rates." Id. at 425, 576 P.2d at 380.
In Mystic Valley Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 359 Mass. 420, 269 N.E.2d 233
(1971), the court stated, "[Our decisions] do not permit the D.P.U. to disregard (in fixing
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mits, 10 that each case must be resolved on its own facts when
determining whether or not the actual capital structure of the utility is unreasonable or imprudent, and if so, what capital structure
may be applied as reasonable and prudent under the
circumstances.
Additionally, the term "hypothetical" has been used differently
in different cases. As a result, a "numbers" game or count of cases,
merely by reference to the term "hypothetical" without examining
how the term is used in each case, inaccurately reflects the number
of jurisdictions that adopt a truly hypothetical capital structure
approach. For example, in some cases, "hypothetical" describes
adjustments to the actual capital structure when the test period is
incomplete at the time the record closes.II This certainly is not the
type of "hypothetical" capital structure Louiselle and Heilman
propose.
In other cases, a "hypothetical" capital structure describes adjustments to an actual capital structure to eliminate non-utility acrates) existing capital structures of regulated companies unless they so unreasonably and
substantially vary from usual practice as to impose an unfair burden on the consumer."
Id. at 429, 269 N.E.2d at 239.
In Tampa Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 398 (Fla. P.S.C. 1971), the commission stated:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that management, with full knowledge of the company's particular circumstances and its relationship to the growth and development of its service area, has by deliberate
design developed such a capital structure as will keep within reasonable bounds
the financial risk of the company and enable it to obtain necessary capital at
reasonable cost.
Id. at 416.
Likewise, in General Tel. Co. of California, 80 P.U.R.3d 2 (Cal. P.U.C. 1969), the
California Public Utilities Commission stated, "In our opinion, it is preferable to use the
actual capital structure, or as close an approximation as possible, unless it is entirely inconsistent with good regulatory practice." Id. at 23.
In Florida Power & Light Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 113 (Fla. P.S.C. 1966), it was well reasoned that:
Management lives from day to day with intricate and complex problems of
corporate finance, and has the responsibility of seeing that the utility has the
financial ability to meet its public duties. The invasion of the field of management in such a sensitive area is justified only when the pubic interest requires the
exercise of extreme measures for its protection and benefit.
Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
In Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 93 P.U.R.3d 13
(Penn. P.U.C. 197 1), the commission stated, "However, capital structure is management's
prerogative and we do not attempt to transgress this prerogative unless wide margbzs ofacceptabi/sty are exceeded to points of unreasonableness." Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
10. Louiselle & Heilman, supra note 1, at 426-34.
11. Laclede Gas Co., 27 P.U.R.4th 241 (Mo. P.S.C. 1978); Central Main Power Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 405 A.2d 153 (Me.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1979); South Cent.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 373 So. 2d 478 (La. 1979).
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tivities. In the 1977 and 1980 North Central Public Service
Company cases before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,
the utility made such an adjustment without any objection or
challenge by the intervenors. Those adjustments presented both
the North Central operating division and Donovan Companies,
Inc., unconsolidated as a "gas distribution' utility," in conformity
with the rate of return testimony presented by the Department of
Public Service (Department). In El Paso NaturalGas Co. ,12 the Federal Power Commission approved such adjustments, stating:
In our opinion a fair rate of return should be based upon a
capitalization that is associated with the utility business where
a separation is feasible, as it is here. When the capitalization
reflects investment in properties not related to the jurisdictional
business which we are regulating, a distortion of the rate of return determination may result3 unless capitalization is adjusted
to exclude these investments.'
Certainly, this is not the type of "hypothetical" capital structure
that Louiselle and Heilman propose.
In other cases, particularly telephone cases, the term "hypothetical" describes recognition of the parent-subsidiary relationship
and adjustments made to reflect the effects of that relationship
upon the capital structure of the subsidiary. At least to the extent
that these cases involve the use of "double leverage," even
Louiselle and Heilman acknowledge that they do not involve a
"hypothetical" capital structure of the sort they sponsor.
Finally, there are cases that involve adjustments to the actual
capital structure of a utility for specific reasons found by the regulatory authority. These cases, however, usually do not entail substantial debt/equity percentage differences between the actual
structure and the structure ultimately utilized. Again, this is not
the type of "hypothetical" capital structure advanced by Louiselle
and Heilman.
It simply is inaccurate to suggest, as Louiselle and Heilman do,
that most jurisdictions approach the determination of the capital
structure applicable in a rate case without beginning with the actual capital structure or the capital structure proposed by the utility based upon the actual circumstances of the utility. Similarly, it
is inaccurate to suggest that any more than a small minority of the
jurisdictions favor or would adopt a capital structure determined
12. 44 F.P.C. 73, 85 P.U.R.3d 309 (1970), aj'd, 449 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. Id. at 77, 85 P.U.R.3d at 313.
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by matters aside from the actual circumstances of the utility,
without first determining that the actual capital structure of the
utility is unreasonable and imprudent in some substantial respect.
The imaginary or "hypothetical" capital structure sponsored by
Louiselle and Heilman, which disregards the actual circumstances
of the utility involved, is typified by the Department's "hypothetical" proposals in the 1977 and 1980 North Central Public Service
Company rate cases. 14 In both North Central cases, the Department disregarded the actual capital structure of the North Central
Public Service Company division and Donovan Companies, Inc.,
unconsolidated. Instead, it proposed the use of an average of the
common equity ratios of a number of "comparison" gas distribution companies, thirteen in 1977 and sixteen in 1980.
The Department also disregarded the equity character of the
comparison companies' preferred stock and the costs associated
with preferred stock. It averaged only the common equity ratios of
the comparison companies, which, in effect, combined preferred
stock and debt for the purposes of constructing a "hypothetical"
capital structure for North Central Public Service Company.
Donovan Companies, Inc. (North Central) has no preferred stock.
The Department made no study of the prudence and reasonableness of the actual capital structure of North Central Public
Service Company and Donovan Companies, Inc. The Department neither asserted nor presented any evidence that the actual
capital structures were unreasonable or imprudent, but merely asserted that since their actual equity ratio exceeded the average
common equity ratio of the so-called "comparison" companies,
they should be replaced by a hypothetical capital structure containing a common equity ratio equal to the average of the comparison companies.
In the 1980 North Central case,' 5 the Department witness acknowledged that the capital structure used by the utility was "appropriate in that it is real in some sense." He further conceded
that there was no ideal capital structure for the company. The
Department witness also conceded that he had "perhaps simplified
things here too much" when he testified that the actual capital
14. North Cent. Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-010/GR-80-422 (Minn. P.U.C. June
19, 1981); North Cent. Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-101/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
30, 1977).
15. North Cent. Pub. Serv. Co., Docket No. G-1O1/GR-80-422 (Minn. P.U.C. June
19, 1981).
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structure of the company "is simply the product of management
decisions and policy." He recognized on cross-examination that
there "absolutely are" external factors that influence capital

structure. 16
Nevertheless, the Department in both cases urged that the average equity ratio of the comparison companies was the appropriate
capital structure for North Central Public Service. Obviously, if
the average equity ratio of the comparison companies was appropriate for North Central, then it follows that it is appropriate for
each of the comparison companies, and, for that matter, any other
gas distribution company arguably comparable to the comparison
companies or North Central. In other words, the Department advanced the average as an "ideal" or "per se" gas distribution company capital structure, the very thing the Department witness
conceded did not exist.
Ironically, although espousing the average as the appropriate
capital structure for North Central and other gas distribution companies, the Department did so without studying the capital structures of the comparison companies, their bond indentures, their
bond ratings, the terms of their preferred stock or common stock,
the existence or absence of non-utility operations, their size or risk
relative to North Central or the other companies, the existence of
subsidiary operations, the acknowledged trend in recent years and
currently to heavier common equity ratios, the timeliness of the
ratios used, or the many other factors individual to each of the
companies that might affect the reasonableness or prudency of its
capital structure or the appropriateness of its comparison to North
Central or any other gas distribution company.
The unavoidable reaction to the Department proposal was
stated by the commission in its order in the 1980 North Central
case:
The Commission finds Dr. Rettenmayer's testimony singularly
unpersuasive. Although he acknowledged a trend towards
higher common equity ratios for gas distribution utilities, he
was content to establish an appropriate equity ratio for the
Company in the test year ending September 30, 1981 on the
basis of 1979 data. Although he acknowledged that preferred
stock was equity, and had tax consequences similar to common
stock, and a cost higher than that of debt, in his capital structure recommendation he simply treated the 7.7% preferred
16. Id. (Hearings Transcript, Vol. III, at 120-21).
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stock of his average 1979 capital structure as debt, and at the
cost of debt. He made no response to the Company's contention that his recommendations would render the Company unable to issue debt under the terms of its bond indenture.
Finally, Dr. Rettenmayer made no determination that his proposed hypothetical capital structure was desirable, and no
study of the reasonableness or desirability of the capital structures of his 16 companies. This is a significant shortcoming in
view of the Commission's discussion of its rejection of a proposed hypothetical capital structure in the previous case:
[The witness] has shown no reason why it should be assumed that the average capital structure of this group of
companies should be assumed to be a desirable capital
structure. Since there has been no analysis of the companies' individual capital structures to determine if they are
desirable, there is no structure to determine if they are desirable, there is no reason to believe the composite capital
structure is desirable. North Central, G-010/GR-77-221, at
15, 16.
The commission finds that equity ratios of natural gas distribution companies have been increasing recently; that because the
Company has no preferred stock its common equity ratio can
be higher than that of a gas distribution company which has
preferred stock; that the Company's equity ratio is not out of
line with the equity ratios of comparison companies, and that
no testimony has shown the Company's proposed capital struc17
ture to be unreasonable.
The premise of Louiselle and Heilman, and that of the Department in the two North Central cases, appears to be that even if the
capital structure proposed by the utility, based on its actual circumstances, is reasonable and prudent, that capital structure
should be disregarded and any hypothetical structure that appears
in the short term to be more "economical" should be imposed, unless the utility demonstrates that the hypothetical is unsafe. They
argue that a challenge by an intervenor that more debt would be
cheaper should trigger imposition of a hypothetical capital structure. Since they claim that debt is always cheaper than equity, a
hypothetical capital structure could be adopted in every case. In
effect, Louiselle and Heilman refuse to consider the factors that
influence the development of a utility's capital structure, which
they characterize as totally within "management discretion." To
17. Id. at 8.
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Louiselle and Heilman, any capital structure with a higher debt
ratio than the actual is appropriate.
Professor Phillips, in The Economics of Regulation, states:
[T]here is no ideal capital structure, and even expert opinion
can differ. The existing capitalization may well have resulted
from sound and economical decisions when made, although a
different structure might attract capital at a lower cost at the
time of a rate case. While hindsight is often superior to foresight, financial decisions must be made on the basis of a judgment of present and future conditions. "It seems, then, that it
is economically sound to leave with management the decision
as to proper debt ratio, at least within that area where the directors are not usurping or defaulting on their duties as
directors." 8

In an initial brief filed in Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. ,19 testimony of Mr. William R. Field, an economic analyst with H.
Zinder and Associates, recounted on behalf of Midwestern some of
the different elements and judgments affecting management discretion and evolution of the financial structure of a utility:
[N]ot only differing facts and circumstances underlying the development of each company and its capitalization but also differing opinions expressed in making honest and good faith
business decisions based on those facts and circumstances.
Such reasons include: differing perceptions of risks facing the
industry as well as the particular entity; differences in age
groups and backgrounds (e.g., those who "remember the depression"); different timing as to building the basic system and
the different impacts of sinking fund mechanics; differing
financial conditions relative to the timing of capital requirements; different perceptions as to where the industry and company stands in its 'life cycle' relative to gas supply and growth
opportunities; different opportunities and requirements (sometimes quite fortuitous) as to major expansions, gas storage
projects, additional compression, supplemental gas projects,
gathering facilities, advance payments, etc.; honest differences
of opinions as to the appropriate dividend payout policy; differences in views as to permanency in tax laws as to the deductibility of interest or the treatment of dividends; differences in
views of debt and preferred capital as 'obligations' to a similar
18. C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 283 (1969) (footnotes omitted); see

also J.

BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 243-44 (1962); Foster, Fair
Return Criteriaand Estimation, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 883, 890-92 (1976).
19. Docket Nos. RP81-17, RP81-57 (F.E.R.C. Mar. 15, 1982) (copy on file in William
Mitchell Law Review office).
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20
nature; etc.

Other factors also affect the evolution of the capital structure of
each particular utility involved in a rate case proceeding and each
utility used as a comparison company in the derivation of an "imaginary" capital structure as was proposed in the North Central
cases. In addition, market forces affect the financial structure of
each company, as the Department's witnesses acknowledged in the
North Central cases. Management discretion obviously does not
control all these factors.
Louiselle and Heilman erroneously argue that, since all rates
must be "just and reasonable," the actual capital structure of the
utility cannot be deemed to be prima facie reasonable and prudent. They insist that the utility must carry the initial burden of
proving that its capital structure is reasonable and prudent. To
the contrary, substantial authority holds that a utility's expenses
are presumed prudently incurred, with the burden upon interven21
ors to show unreasonableness or imprudence.
By emphasizing the "just and reasonable" requirements of Bluefield and Hope, and the indication in Permian Basin that the regulatory process includes an assessment of the broad public interest,
Louiselle and Heilman have neglected the standard established by
Hope, Bluefield, and applicable Minnesota law. A utility is entitled
to a fair and reasonable return upon its investment for the period
during which the rates are collected.
The utility is at all times answerable to the utilities commission,
not only for the maintenance of rates which are "just and reasonable," but associated therewith, for the preservation of a capital
structure that is reasonable and prudent. Of that there is no argument. Therefore, if the intervenor presents creditable and material evidence of the unreasonable and imprudent nature of the
actual capital structure of the utility, the burden shifts to the utility to persuade the commission that its capital structure is actually
reasonable and prudent. This ultimate burden of persuasion, however, does not conflict with the sensible rule of Minnesota and
other jurisdictions that the actual capital structure, adjusted as
may be feasible in the rate case to remove the effect of non-utility
20. Id. at 22.
21. See West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); Anaheim v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 669 F.2d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 198 1),citing Missouri ex
rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1
(1923).
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activities and to fit the test period, shall not be departed from unless it has been first established to be unreasonable and imprudent.
The suggestion of Louiselle and Heilman that the commission
abandons its regulatory authority over the capital structure of the
utility by the rule indicated above is unfounded. Instead, that rule
establishes the most reasonable approach to the capital structure
issue and assures that the rate of return allowed is based upon the
utzlty s investment at the time the rates are being collected.
The imposition of a capital structure divorced from the actual
circumstances of the utility, while at the same time establishing a
rate of return based on a market cost analysis, reduces the effective
allowed rate of return and aborts the market cost rate of return
determination. The market based rate of return becomes only a
pretense because the allowed overall rate of return will be at the
lower effective rate after the effects of the hypothetical capital
structure are felt.
Theoretically, one of the purposes for imposing a hypothetical
capital structure is to cause the utility to reduce the amount of
equity and to increase the amount of debt in its actual capital
structure. Since the utility must go to the market for its debt and
equity capital based upon its actual capital structure, the imposition of a hypothetical capital structure may make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the utility to effect the regulator's desired change in
its capital structure. That is, the lowering of the effective rate of
return by imposition of the hypothetical capital structure may
make it impossible for the utility to increase its debt ratio while at
the same time meeting its capital needs. That is clearly the case if
the hypothetical structure, being based upon factors other than the
actual circumstances of the company, prevents the utility from
meeting its bond indenture requirements for the placement of additional debt. If additional debt actually cannot be placed, the
capital needs of the utility will then have to be satisfied out of
further equity investments. Instead of accomplishing a reduction
of the common equity ratio, the effect of the hypothetical structure
may be that a heavier equity ratio will actually be necessary. Further, even if some debt can still be placed, the actual circumstances of the utility probably will worsen because the additional
debt will either be short term debt at high rates or long term debt
at greater rates than would have been demanded by lenders had a
higher effective rate of return been allowed on the actual capital
structure.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982
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SPECIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE MINNESOTA RULE

The reasons supporting the rule established by statute, case authority, and actions of the commission in Minnesota, that the actual capital structure of the utility will not be disturbed unless it is
first shown that the actual capital structure is unreasonable and
imprudent, are numerous:
a. Each gas and electric utility is required to obtain approval
of changes in its actual capital structure and to provide capital
structure information regarding both the utility and any parent or
22
subsidiary corporation. Capital structure is defined by statute
and discussed by commission rule:
A rate of return/cost of capital summary schedule showing the
calculation of the weighted cost of capital using the proposed
capital structure and the average capital structure for the most
recent fiscal year and the projected fiscal year. This information shall be provided for the unconsolidated parent and subconstant
sidiary corporations. These statutes and rules provide
23
scrutiny over the capital structures of utilities.
b. Although the commission may reserve in financial dockets
that its approval of the capital structure in those proceedings does
not preclude its reconsideration of capital structure in rate proceedings, nevertheless, the capital structure of the utility stands approved by order of the commission in its financial dockets as being
in the best interests of both the utility and its customers. Furthermore, if the capital structure of the utility has been considered and
approved by the commission in a prior rate proceeding, the capital
structure, subject to changes since that time, stands approved and
should be regarded as prima facie reasonable and prudent.
c. A presumption, although rebuttable, that the actions of the
utility in the regular course of business are legal and proper is
appropriate.
d. The Bluefield and Hope requirement that a fair return be allowed on the investment of the utility at the time the rates are in
effect necessarily directs itself to acceptance of the actual capital
structure of the utility, at least in the first instance.
e. Presuming that market cost methodology is used for determination of the allowable rate of return, the actual capital structure is that which the market reflects; not a hypothetical. To use a
hypothetical aborts the market cost rate of return analysis.
22.
23.

MINN. STAT.

13

§ 216B.49(2) (1982).

MINN. CODE AGENCY

R. PSC 405(D)(1) (1982).
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f. The actual capital structure determines the utility's ability
to compete for capital. It should not be hamstrung in competing
for capital by disregard of the actual capital structure in the rate
proceeding, absent a determination that the actual capital structure is unreasonable and imprudent.
g. Utility management carries the day to day responsibility for
the financial structure of the utility and is accountable to the regulatory authorities, its investors, and customers. Absent a determination that their actions have been unreasonable and imprudent,
it is inappropriate to displace their judgment in favor of that of
consultants who have no significant on-going accountability and
do not share in the consequences of errors of judgment. This is
particularly true when the consultants have no actual experience
in the placement of debt and equity capital on behalf of utilities,
lenders or underwriters.
h. Louiselle and Heilman assert that it is "an established principle of law that the party asserting or denying the existence of
facts has the burden of proof as to those facts."' 24 That principle
should place the burden upon the party challenging the actual
capital structure, the basic factual setting in the case, to establish
that the actual capital structure is unreasonable and imprudent.
The actual capital structure of the utility is fact, not speculation.
Any contrary facts alleged should be the burden of the challenger.
i. No single ideal capital structure exists. Accordingly, the first
step of any consideration should be the actual capital structure
itself, until it is shown to be unreasonable and imprudent.
j. To maintain economic and efficient rate regulation proceedings, intervenors opposing the use of an actual capital structure
should be required to show by material, creditable evidence that
the actual capital structure is unreasonable and imprudent.
k. Louiselle and Heilman in effect assert that there exists an
impropriety on the part of management in allowing a capital
structure to evolve which does not produce the lowest immediate
possible cost. Their insinuation, that the application of "management discretion" is improper, should place the burden of proving
such a claim of impropriety upon the challenger.
1. Basic fairness dictates that after-the-fact criticism and
"Monday morning quarterbacking" not be allowed to upset management judgments exercised in good faith and with reasonable24. Louiselle & Heilman, supra note 1, at 436.
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ness and prudence. Management, investors, and lenders act on a
daily basis in reliance upon the actual capital structure of the utility, a capital structure that the commission has approved or permitted to exist or occur. It would be both unfair and unwise to
prejudice them by adopting a hypothetical capital structure prior
to it being established that management actions have departed
from the range of reasonableness and prudence.
IV.

NON-MINNESOTA JURISDICTIONS

In all but a very few cases, the regulatory authorities have held
that the actual capital structure will be determined unreasonable
and imprudent and a "hypothetical" structure imposed only if
there is a marked departure from that which might be considered
normal. For example, in Carrabasset Light &Power Co .,25 the Maine
commission followed a two step process. First, it found that the
existing capital structure was unreasonable when it contained only
11.3% debt, all short term, and 88.7% equity. Only then did it
impose a hypothetical structure of 50% debt, 15% preferred, and
26
35% common.
Similarly, in Communications Satellite Corp. (COMSAT) v. Federal
Communications Commissi'on,27 a zero debt structure was adjusted to
reflect 45% debt only after the federal commission first determined
that COMSAT could have leveraged with debt, but unreasonably
did not do so.2 8 In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisi-

ana Public Service Commission ,29 the court affirmed the commission
after the commission had first examined the particular circumstances of the actual capital structure, which contained a debt ratio of 24.7%, and only after finding'it- unreasonable, applied the socalled "45% debt rule" and imposed a "hypothetical" capital
30
structure.
V.

CONCLUSION

Louiselle and Heilman, in proposing their test of reasonableness
of a capital structure, defeat their principle argument that a hypo25. 17 P.U.R.4th 246 (Me. P.U.C. 1976).
26. Id. at 247-48.
27. 611 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28. Id. at 902-06.
29. 239 La. 175, 118 So. 2d 372 (1960).
30. Id. at 195-203, 18 So. 2d at 380-82. For additional cases from other jurisdictions,
see supra note 9.
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thetical structure should be imposed without regard to the actual
capital structure and without any preliminary showing that the
actual capital structure is unreasonable or imprudent. Their "reasonableness test" requires that the beginning point be the actual
capital structure of the utility. They further concede that "while
such analyses cannot produce the optimum capital structure, they
can answer the question of whether a particular capital structure is
safe."' 3' In other words, they concede that no single ideal capital
structure exists. They then make the extreme statement that if a
capital structure contains x% debt and is safe, one containing more
than x% debt would be even safer. Their rationale is most suspect
if it is based upon that conclusion.
Their "test of reasonableness" further acknowledges the difficulty in appraising the reasonableness and prudence of a capital
structure and the lack of sense in looking to a hypothetical capital
structure divorced from the actual circumstances of the particular
utility. They state various factors that must be considered in determining whether the hypothetical is safe, all of which must relate
to the particular utility. This conflicts with the use of a hypothetical derived from the data of other companies.
The Louiselle and Heilman argument as to safety of a capital
structure is flawed when they suggest that a decline in the bond
rating of a utility is acceptable and "not determinative" so long as
the bonds remain of investment grade. The safety of a capital
structure bearing the affect of a reduction of its bond rating from
"AAA" to "Baa" must be suspect in the real world of placement of
debt or equity capital, if not in the utopian world of economic
theory.
The Louiselle and Heilman discussion of the economy gained
through increasing the debt ratio is also flawed because it fails to
recognize that the cost of equity will increase as the debt structure
and the risk confronted by investors rises. Louiselle and Heilman
also fail to recognize an increment of additional debt cost by reason of the fact that the additional debt should be installed at the
cost of placement of debt today, rather than at the embedded debt
coSt.

32

In conclusion, it appears the basic error of Louiselle and Heilman is their assumption that the sensible rule adopted in Minnesota requires the commission to defer entirely to management with
31. Louiselle & Heilman, supra note 1, at 446.
32. See Citizens Util. Co., 34 P.U.R.4th 606, 617 (Idaho P.U.C. 1980).
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respect to the capital structure of the utility. This is simply incorrect. The commission is not required to withdraw, nor has it withdrawn, from its responsibility to make utilities answerable for
reasonable and prudent capital structures. The rule in Minnesota
is, and should remain, consistent with that in most jurisdictions.
There will not be a departure from the utility's actual capital
structure unless it is first established by material, creditable evidence that the actual capital structure is unreasonable and imprudent. This rule provides a sound and practical approach to the
resolution of capital structure issues and is fair to both utilities and
customers.
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